On June 22, the United States, acting in support of its closest ally Israel, launched airstrikes against nuclear sites in Iran. The full consequences of the operation – for Iran’s nuclear program and for the broader balance of power in the Middle East – remain uncertain. But in Moscow, reactions were swift. Russian politicians and foreign policy experts have begun drawing conclusions, offering early forecasts and strategic interpretations of what may come next.

6 月 22 日，美國為支持其最親密盟友以色列，對伊朗核設(shè)施發(fā)動空襲。這次行動對伊朗核計劃乃至中東整體力量平衡的全面影響尚不明朗。但莫斯科方面反應(yīng)迅速，俄羅斯政界人士和外交政策專家已開始研判局勢，對后續(xù)發(fā)展提出初步預(yù)測和戰(zhàn)略解讀。

In this special report, RT presents the view from Russia: a collection of sharp, often contrasting perspectives from analysts and officials on what Washington’s latest military move means for the region – and for the world.

在本專題報道中，RT 呈現(xiàn)俄羅斯視角：匯集分析人士與官員們對華盛頓最新軍事行動影響的犀利見解——這些觀點往往相互矛盾，涉及該地區(qū)乃至全球局勢。

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs:

《全球事務(wù)中的俄羅斯》主編費奧多爾·盧基揚諾夫：

The trap awaiting Trump is simple – but highly effective. If Iran responds by targeting American assets, the US will be pulled deeper into a military confrontation almost by default. If on the other hand, Tehran holds back or offers only a token response, Israel’s leadership – backed by its neoconservative allies in Washington – will seize the moment to pressure the White House: now is the time to finish off a weakened regime and force a convenient replacement. Until that happens, they’ll argue the job isn’t done. Whether Trump is willing – or even able – to resist that pressure remains uncertain.

等待特朗普的陷阱簡單卻極其有效。若伊朗通過襲擊美國資產(chǎn)進行報復(fù)，美國幾乎會不由自主地更深卷入軍事對抗。反之，若德黑蘭選擇克制或僅作象征性回應(yīng)，以色列領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層——憑借其在華盛頓的新保守主義盟友支持——將趁機向白宮施壓：此刻正是徹底擊垮虛弱政權(quán)、扶植傀儡替代者的良機。他們會堅稱，除非達成此目標，否則行動就不算完成。特朗普是否愿意——甚至能否——頂住這種壓力，目前仍是未知數(shù)。

Most likely, Iran will avoid hitting US targets directly in an effort to prevent a point-of-no-return escalation with American forces. Instead, it will likely intensify its strikes on Israel. Netanyahu, in turn, will double down on his efforts to convince Washington that regime change in Tehran is the only viable path forward – something Trump, at least for now, remains instinctively opposed to. Still, the momentum of military entanglement has a logic of its own, and it’s rarely easy to resist.

伊朗很可能會避免直接打擊美國目標，以防止與美軍沖突升級到不可挽回的地步。相反，德黑蘭或?qū)⒓訌妼σ陨械囊u擊力度。而內(nèi)塔尼亞胡則會加倍努力說服華盛頓——唯有推翻伊朗現(xiàn)政權(quán)才是可行之路，這一主張至少在目前仍遭到特朗普的本能抵觸。不過軍事對抗的勢頭自有其發(fā)展邏輯，往往難以遏制。

Tigran Meloyan, analyst at the Center for Strategic Research, Higher School of Economics:

高等經(jīng)濟大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略研究中心分析師蒂格蘭·梅洛揚：

If Iran does nothing, it risks appearing weak – both at home and abroad. That makes a carefully calibrated response almost inevitable: one designed not to escalate the conflict, but to preserve domestic legitimacy and project resolve. Tehran is unlikely to go much further than that. Meanwhile, by continuing to build up its military presence, Washington sends a clear deterrent message – signaling both readiness and resolve in case Tehran miscalculates.

若伊朗毫無作為，其國內(nèi)外形象都將受損。因此德黑蘭幾乎必然要做出精心校準的回應(yīng)——這種回應(yīng)旨在避免沖突升級，同時維護國內(nèi)統(tǒng)治合法性并彰顯決心。但伊朗的行動不太可能超出這個限度。與此同時，美國通過持續(xù)增兵傳遞出明確的威懾信號，既表明已做好充分準備，也展現(xiàn)了若伊朗誤判形勢必將遭遇堅決回擊的姿態(tài)。

Another option for Iran could be a dramatic symbolic move: withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Such a step would be Tehran’s way of declaring that Trump, by striking nuclear infrastructure, has effectively dismantled the global nonproliferation regime. The NPT was supposed to guarantee Iran’s security; instead, it has delivered the opposite. Still, if Iran goes down that path, it risks damaging ties with Moscow and Beijing – neither of which wants to see a challenge to the existing nuclear order.

伊朗的另一個選擇可能是采取極具象征意義的行動：退出《不擴散核武器條約》（NPT）。此舉將是德黑蘭宣告特朗普通過打擊核設(shè)施，實際上已摧毀全球防擴散體系的方式。該條約本應(yīng)保障伊朗的安全，卻帶來了相反的結(jié)果。不過，如果伊朗走上這條路，可能會損害與莫斯科和北京的關(guān)系——這兩國都不愿看到現(xiàn)有核秩序受到挑戰(zhàn)。

The bigger question now is whether Iran will even consider returning to talks with Washington after this attack. Why negotiate when American promises no longer mean anything? Tehran urgently needs a mediator who can restrain Trump from further escalation – and right now, the only credible candidate is Moscow. Iran’s foreign minister, [Abbas] Araghchi, is set to meet with President Putin on June 23. It’s hard to imagine that a potential NPT withdrawal won’t be on the table. If in the past an Iranian bomb was considered an existential threat to Israel, the calculus has now reversed: for Iran, nuclear capability is quickly becoming a question of survival.

當前更大的問題是，伊朗是否還會考慮與華盛頓重啟談判。當美國的承諾已毫無信用可言時，為何還要談判？德黑蘭亟需一位能阻止特朗普進一步升級局勢的調(diào)停者——而眼下唯一可信的人選只有莫斯科。伊朗外長[阿巴斯]·阿拉格希定于 6 月 23 日與普京總統(tǒng)會晤。很難想象《不擴散核武器條約》的潛在退出不會成為議題。如果說過去伊朗的核彈被視為對以色列的生存威脅，那么如今形勢已徹底逆轉(zhuǎn)：對伊朗而言，核能力正迅速演變?yōu)殛P(guān)乎存亡的問題。

Konstantin Kosachev, vice speaker of the Federation Council:

俄羅斯聯(lián)邦委員會副主席康斯坦丁·科薩切夫：

Let’s state the obvious: Iraq, Libya – and now Iran – were bombed because they couldn’t hit back. They either didn’t have weapons of mass destruction or hadn’t yet developed them. In some cases, they never even intended to. Meanwhile, the West doesn’t touch the four countries that remain outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty: India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Why? Because unlike Iraq, Libya, and Iran, these states actually possess nuclear weapons.

讓我們闡明一個顯而易見的事實：伊拉克、利比亞——現(xiàn)在是伊朗——之所以遭到轟炸，是因為它們無力反擊。這些國家要么沒有大規(guī)模殺傷性武器，要么尚未研發(fā)成功。在某些情況下，它們甚至從未有過研發(fā)意圖。而西方卻對《不擴散核武器條約》框架外的四個國家——印度、巴基斯坦、朝鮮和以色列——秋毫無犯。為什么？因為與伊拉克、利比亞和伊朗不同，這些國家確實擁有核武器。

The message to so-called ‘threshold’ nations couldn’t be clearer: if you don’t want to be bombed by the West, arm yourself. Build deterrence. Go all the way – even to the point of developing weapons of mass destruction. That’s the grim conclusion many countries will draw. It’s a dangerous lesson, and one that flies in the face of global security and the very idea of a rules-based international order.

這對所謂"核門檻國家"傳遞的信息再清楚不過：若不想遭受西方轟炸，就必須武裝自己。建立威懾力量。甚至不惜發(fā)展大規(guī)模殺傷性武器——這是許多國家將得出的殘酷結(jié)論。這種危險的教訓(xùn)，公然違背全球安全理念和基于規(guī)則的國際秩序原則。

Yet it’s the West that keeps driving this logic. Iraq was invaded over a vial of powder. Libya gave up its nuclear program and was torn apart. Iran joined the NPT, worked with the IAEA, and didn’t attack Israel – unlike Israel, which just struck Iran while staying outside the NPT and refusing to cooperate with nuclear watchdogs. This is more than hypocrisy; it’s a catastrophic failure of US policy.

然而正是西方不斷推動這種邏輯。伊拉克因一小瓶粉末遭入侵。利比亞放棄核計劃后卻四分五裂。伊朗加入《不擴散核武器條約》并與國際原子能機構(gòu)合作，且未攻擊以色列——反觀以色列，其置身條約之外且拒絕與核監(jiān)督機構(gòu)合作，卻剛剛襲擊了伊朗。這不僅是虛偽，更是美國政策的災(zāi)難性失敗。

Trump’s administration has made a colossal mistake. The pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize has taken on grotesque and dangerous proportions.

特朗普政府犯下了巨大錯誤。對諾貝爾和平獎的追逐已呈現(xiàn)出荒誕而危險的態(tài)勢。

Alexander Dugin, political philosopher and geopolitical analyst

亞歷山大·杜金，政治哲學(xué)家兼地緣政治分析師

Some still cling to the illusion that World War III might somehow pass us by. It won’t. We are already in the thick of it. The US has carried out a bombing strike against Iran – our ally. Nothing stopped them. And if nothing stopped them from bombing Iran, then nothing will stop them from targeting us next. At some point, they may decide that Russia, like Iran, shouldn’t be allowed to possess nuclear weapons – or find some other pretext to strike. Make no mistake: we are at war.

仍有人幻想第三次世界大戰(zhàn)或許能與我們擦肩而過。不會的。我們已深陷其中。美國對我們的盟友伊朗實施了轟炸襲擊。沒有任何力量阻止他們。既然轟炸伊朗無人阻攔，那么接下來攻擊我們時同樣無人能阻。終有一日，他們可能認定俄羅斯和伊朗一樣不該擁有核武器——或隨便找個借口發(fā)動打擊。務(wù)必認清：我們已處于戰(zhàn)爭狀態(tài)。

The US can attack whether we advance or retreat. It’s not about strategy – it’s about will. Ukraine may not be Israel in the eyes of the West, but it plays a similar role. Israel didn’t always exist; it was created and quickly became a proxy for the collective West – though some Israelis would argue the opposite, that the West is merely a proxy for Israel. Ukraine has followed the same trajectory. No wonder Zelensky isn’t asking for Western support – he’s demanding it, including nuclear arms. The model is clear. And just like Israel bombs Gaza with impunity, Kiev bombarded Donbass for years – albeit with fewer resources and less restraint from Moscow.

無論我們進或退，美國都可能發(fā)動攻擊。這無關(guān)戰(zhàn)略——關(guān)鍵在于意志。在西方眼中，烏克蘭或許不是以色列，卻扮演著相似角色。以色列并非自古存在；它被創(chuàng)造出來，迅速成為西方集團的代理人——盡管部分以色列人持相反觀點，認為西方才是以色列的代理人。烏克蘭正沿著相同軌跡發(fā)展。難怪澤連斯基不是在請求西方支持，而是以索取姿態(tài)要求援助，甚至包括核武器。模式已然清晰。正如以色列轟炸加沙卻不受懲罰，基輔多年來也持續(xù)炮擊頓巴斯——只不過資源更匱乏，且莫斯科方面約束力較弱。

Our appeals to the UN and calls for peace have become meaningless. If Iran falls, Russia is next. Trump, once again, is firmly in the grip of the neocons – just as he was during his first term. The MAGA project is over. There is no “great America,” only standard-issue globalism in its place.

我們對聯(lián)合國的呼吁與和平訴求已失去意義。若伊朗倒下，下一個就是俄羅斯。特朗普再次被新保守派牢牢掌控——與他首個任期時如出一轍。MAGA 計劃已然終結(jié)。這里沒有"偉大的美國"，取而代之的只是標準版的全球主義。

Trump thinks he can strike once – like he did with Soleimani – and then walk it back. But there’s no walking this back. He has triggered a world war he cannot control, let alone win.

特朗普以為他能像刺殺蘇萊曼尼那樣一擊即退。但這次沒有回頭路可走。他挑起了一場自己無法控制、更不可能獲勝的世界大戰(zhàn)。

Now, everything hinges on Iran. If it stays on its feet and keeps fighting, it might still prevail. The Strait of Hormuz is closed. The Houthis have blocked traffic in the Red Sea. As new players enter the fray, the situation will evolve rapidly. China will try to stay out – for now. Until the first blow lands on them, too.

如今，一切取決于伊朗。若其能站穩(wěn)腳跟持續(xù)抗爭，仍有勝算?；魻柲酒澓{已被封鎖，胡塞武裝切斷了紅海航道。隨著新勢力加入戰(zhàn)局，局勢將急劇變化。中國目前仍試圖置身事外——直到第一記重拳也落到他們身上。

But if Iran folds, it won’t just lose itself – it will expose the rest of us. That includes Russia, now facing an existential choice. The question isn’t whether to fight. Russia is already fighting. The question is how. The old methods are exhausted. That means we’ll have to find a new way to fight – and fast.

但若伊朗倒下，不僅自身淪陷，更將令我們所有人暴露無遺。這包括正面臨生存抉擇的俄羅斯。問題已非是否應(yīng)戰(zhàn)——俄羅斯早已身處戰(zhàn)場，關(guān)鍵在于如何應(yīng)戰(zhàn)。舊有手段已然窮盡，這意味著我們必須迅速找到新的斗爭方式。

Dmitry Novikov, associate professor at the Higher School of Economics

高等經(jīng)濟學(xué)院副教授德米特里·諾維科夫

Judging by the remarks from Hegseth and General Cain at the press conference, the US appears to be signaling the end of its direct involvement – at least for now. Officially, Iran’s nuclear program has been “eliminated.” Whether that’s actually true is beside the point. Even if Tehran manages to build a bomb six months from now, the narrative is set: the operation was targeted solely at nuclear infrastructure, with no strikes on military forces or civilians. A narrow, clean, and – according to Washington – decisively successful mission. The job is done, the curtain falls.

從赫格塞斯和凱恩將軍在新聞發(fā)布會上的發(fā)言判斷，美國似乎在釋放結(jié)束直接介入的信號——至少目前如此。官方宣稱伊朗的核計劃已被"徹底摧毀"。事實是否如此并不重要。即便德黑蘭半年后成功造出核彈，輿論基調(diào)已然確立：此次行動僅針對核設(shè)施，未襲擊軍事力量或平民。這是一次精準、干凈且——用華盛頓的話說——決定性成功的任務(wù)。大幕落下，任務(wù)完成。

That doesn’t mean Washington is walking away. The US will continue to back Israel and retains the capacity to escalate if needed. But for the moment, the mood seems to be one of self-congratulatory closure.

這并不意味著華盛頓會抽身而退。美國將繼續(xù)支持以色列，并保留必要時升級局勢的能力。但就此刻而言，空氣中彌漫著自我慶功的收場氛圍。

Of course, if they really wanted to go all in, they could’ve used a tactical nuclear weapon.

當然，若真打算孤注一擲，他們本可動用戰(zhàn)術(shù)核武器。

That would’ve offered undeniable “proof” of an Iranian bomb: if it explodes, it must have existed. And second, it would’ve allowed the administration to claim it had destroyed nuclear weapons on Iranian soil. Both assertions would’ve been technically accurate – if strategically absurd.

這將成為伊朗核武"確鑿證據(jù)"：只要爆炸發(fā)生，就證明其存在。其次，美國政府可宣稱已摧毀伊朗境內(nèi)的核武器。兩種說法在技術(shù)層面都成立——盡管戰(zhàn)略上荒謬至極。

None of it would’ve been factually false. Just morally and politically radioactive.

所有指控在事實上都無懈可擊，卻在道義和政治層面貽害無窮。

Sergey Markov, political analyst

謝爾蓋·馬爾科夫（政治分析家）

Why did the US choose to strike Iran now, after years of restraint? The answer is simple: fear. For decades, Washington held back out of concern that any attack would trigger a wave of retaliatory terror attacks – possibly hundreds – carried out by sleeper cells tied to Iran and its allies like Hezbollah. The prevailing assumption was that Iran had quietly prepared networks across the US and Israel, ready to unleash chaos in response.

美國為何在多年克制后選擇此刻打擊伊朗？答案很簡單：恐懼。數(shù)十年來，華盛頓始終忌憚任何攻擊都可能引發(fā)由伊朗及其盟友（如真主黨）潛伏小組實施的報復(fù)性恐襲浪潮——可能高達數(shù)百起。主流觀點認為，伊朗早已在美國和以色列秘密布建網(wǎng)絡(luò)，隨時準備制造混亂作為回應(yīng)。

But Israel’s war in Lebanon dispelled that myth. The feared sleeper cells never materialized. Once that became clear, both Israel and the US realized they could strike Iran with minimal risk of serious blowback.

但以色列在黎巴嫩的戰(zhàn)爭打破了這一神話。令人擔(dān)憂的潛伏組織始終未能成形。當這一點變得明朗后，以色列和美國都意識到，他們可以打擊伊朗而幾乎不必擔(dān)心遭受嚴重報復(fù)。

And so, ironically, Iran’s restraint – its perceived “peacefulness” – has paved the way to war. There’s a lesson in that for Russia: when the West senses both a willingness to negotiate and a refusal to submit, it responds not with diplomacy, but with force. That is the true face of Western imperialism.

諷刺的是，正是伊朗的克制——其表現(xiàn)出的"和平姿態(tài)"——為戰(zhàn)爭鋪平了道路。這對俄羅斯是個警示：當西方既察覺到談判意愿又看到拒不屈服的姿態(tài)時，其回應(yīng)不是外交斡旋，而是武力壓制。這就是西方帝國主義的真實面目。

Vladimir Batyuk, chief research fellow at the Institute for US and Canadian studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

俄羅斯科學(xué)院美國與加拿大研究所首席研究員 弗拉基米爾·巴秋克

Trump has crossed a red line. We’re now facing the real possibility of a major military confrontation. Iran could retaliate by striking US military installations across the Middle East, prompting Washington to respond in kind. That would mark the beginning of a drawn-out armed conflict – one the US may find increasingly difficult to contain.

特朗普已越過紅線。我們現(xiàn)在正面臨重大軍事對抗的現(xiàn)實可能性。伊朗可能通過打擊美國在中東的軍事設(shè)施進行報復(fù)，從而促使華盛頓以牙還牙。這將標志著曠日持久武裝沖突的開端——美國可能會發(fā)現(xiàn)越來越難以控制局勢。

What we’re witnessing looks very much like a victory for the so-called ‘deep state’. Many had expected Trump to hold back, to avoid taking the bait. But he allowed himself to be pulled into a high-risk gamble whose consequences are impossible to predict.

我們目睹的這一幕，極像是所謂"深層政府"的勝利。許多人曾預(yù)期特朗普會保持克制，避免中計。但他卻放任自己卷入這場高風(fēng)險賭局，其后果根本無法預(yù)料。

And politically, this may backfire. If the standoff with Iran sends oil prices soaring, the fallout could be severe. In the United States, gasoline prices are sacrosanct. Any administration that allows them to spiral out of control faces serious domestic repercussions. For Trump, this could turn into a serious vulnerability.

從政治角度看，此舉可能適得其反。若與伊朗的僵局導(dǎo)致油價飆升，后果將極為嚴重。在美國，汽油價格堪稱神圣不可侵犯。任何放任油價失控的政府都將面臨嚴重的國內(nèi)政治反彈。對特朗普而言，這或?qū)⒀葑兂芍卮筌浝摺?br />
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council; former president of Russia

俄羅斯聯(lián)邦安全會議副主席；俄羅斯前總統(tǒng)德米特里·梅德韋杰夫

So, what exactly did the US accomplish with its midnight strike on three targets in Iran?

那么，美國午夜對伊朗三處目標發(fā)動襲擊究竟達成了什么？

1.     Iran’s critical nuclear infrastructure appears to be intact – or at worst, only minimally damaged.

1. 伊朗關(guān)鍵核設(shè)施似乎完好無損——最壞情況下也僅受到輕微破壞。

2.     Uranium enrichment will continue. And let’s just say it plainly now: so will Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

2. 鈾濃縮活動將持續(xù)進行?，F(xiàn)在不妨直說：伊朗研制核武器的進程同樣不會停止。

3.     Several countries are reportedly ready to supply Iran with nuclear warheads directly.

3. 據(jù)報道，多個國家已準備好直接向伊朗提供核彈頭。

4.     Israel is under fire, explosions are echoing through its cities, and civilians are panicking.

4. 以色列正遭受猛烈攻擊，爆炸聲在城市中回蕩，平民陷入恐慌。

5.     The US is now entangled in yet another conflict, this one carrying the very real possibility of a ground war.

5. 美國如今又卷入一場新的沖突，這次極有可能演變?yōu)榈孛鎽?zhàn)爭。

6.     Iran’s political leadership has not only survived – it may have grown stronger.

6. 伊朗政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層不僅挺過了危機——其勢力可能反而有所增強。

7.     Even Iranians who opposed the regime are now rallying around it.

7. 就連反對伊朗政權(quán)的民眾如今也團結(jié)在政府周圍。

8.     Donald Trump, the self-styled peace president, has just launched a new war.

8. 自詡為"和平總統(tǒng)"的特朗普剛剛發(fā)動了一場新戰(zhàn)爭。

9.     The overwhelming majority of the international community is siding against the US and Israel.

9. 國際社會絕大多數(shù)成員都站在美國和以色列的對立面。

10.  At this rate, Trump can kiss that Nobel Peace Prize goodbye – despite how absurdly compromised the award has become.

10. 照這樣下去，特朗普可以徹底告別諾貝爾和平獎了——盡管該獎項早已變得荒謬可笑。

So, congratulations, Mr. President. Truly a stellar start.

所以，祝賀您，總統(tǒng)先生。這真是個輝煌的開局。